On July 1, 2025, the Supreme Court of Maryland, in a 4-3 decision, held that the exclusivity provision of the Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act (“the WC Act”) bars non-dependent adult children of deceased covered employees from bringing wrongful death actions.

In February of 2021, John Ledford, an employee of Jenway Contracting, Inc. (“Jenway”), suffered a fatal fall while working. Summer Ledford, John Ledford’s daughter, was unable to receive benefits through the State’s Workers’ Compensation Act as a non-dependent adult. Instead, Ms. Ledford brought a claim against Jenway under Maryland’s Wrongful Death Act. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County dismissed Ms. Ledford’s complaint, on the grounds that the Act minimizes employer liability to bar otherwise valid wrongful death claims from any persons, whether or not they are eligible for benefits. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the Circuit Court decision, holding that the WC Act’s plain language and legislative purpose, in addition to supporting case law, demonstrates that employer liability is limited to the WC Act, regardless of other proper claims. The Supreme Court of Maryland granted a writ of certiorari to decide whether the WC Act’s exclusivity provision bars wrongful death actions from non-dependent children of deceased covered employees and whether the exclusivity provision violates the state constitutional right to remedy and access to the courts by barring such suits.

In addressing whether the WC Act excludes wrongful death claims by non-dependents, the Court framed the issue as one of statutory interpretation, and began by examining the plain language of the statute:

• Except as otherwise provided in this title, the liability of an employer under this title is exclusive.
• Except as otherwise provided in this title, the compensation provided under this title to a covered employee or the dependents of a covered employee is in place of any right of action against any person.

509. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 9-509.

The Court noted that the “plain language of [the WC Act] is reason alone” to exclude claims like Ms. Ledford’s, reasoning that the statute clearly states that any exceptions to employer liability will be found within the WC Act itself, and no other statute can expand an employer’s liability.

Next, the majority analyzes the Maryland General Assembly’s intent behind the WC Act, determining that the General Assembly intentionally considered and incorporated instances where a covered employee dies without dependents, by requiring employers to cover funeral and burial expenses, to aid non-dependent persons, such as Ms. Ledford. See Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 9-684 et seq.

The Court also held that the WC Act’s exclusivity provision does not violate the State Constitution, since the General Assembly is authorized to place reasonable restrictions on remedies or access to courts. The Court found that Ms. Ledford’s desired remedy is non-traditional and unprotected, since non-dependent children in Maryland have never had the right to sue their parent’s employer for fatal workplace injuries; the Workers’ Compensation Act was passed before the Wrongful Death Act and preemptively excluded wrongful death claims. The Court further stated that where employers have been assured, under the WC Act, that their liability would be limited to covered employees and dependents, it would be unreasonable to allow complaints from non-dependent relatives, as it would “render [employer] immunity effectively meaningless.”

Justices Watts and Biran wrote an initial dissent and began by disagreeing with the majority’s plain language analysis, arguing that the WC Act does not expressly state that the exclusivity provision applies to a covered employee’s non-dependents. Where the plain language of the WC Act makes no mention of non-dependents, the WC Act’s limitations do not apply to cover employees’ non-dependent children; and, as such, should not bar Ms. Ledford’s claim. Furthermore, the dissent asserts that “[t]here is simply nothing” in the WC Act’s legislative history that establishes the General Assembly’s intent to exclude non-dependents of covered employees from bringing a wrongful death claim.

Justices Killough and Biran followed with a second dissent, notably arguing that the Workers’ Compensation Act and the Wrongful Death Act “serve different purposes, operate in different spheres, and cover different classes of plaintiffs[,]” where the requirements of each statute vary; the Workers’ Compensation Act requires dependency, and limits recovery to the Act’s benefits, not providing coverage for loss of companionship or mental anguish. Additionally, while accusing the majority of rewriting the statute by interpreting provisions for final medical and burial expenses as being written for non-dependents of covered employees, the dissent argues that the employer’s coverage of such expenses only shifts costs from healthcare providers and governments. The dissent believes the majority has conflated cost-shifting with compensation, by treating the payment of medical and burial expenses as a substitute for the right to bring a claim, because such payment will not alleviate the loss of “parental love, guidance, or support.” Lastly, the dissent highlights the “troubling” consequences of the majority’s opinion, stating that Ms. Ledford is left with nothing, in contradiction with the General Assembly’s intent when enacting the Workers’ Compensation Act and the Wrongful Death Act. Justices Killough and Biran warn that the Court should be wary of remedial interpretations that eliminate remedies provided by other statutes, “especially when doing so leaves a claimant with no redress at all.”

The Court’s 4-3 decision is likely to be met with mixed reception. On one hand, the decision leaves a class of non-dependents remediless despite having valid claims under statutes outside of the WC Act, which may lead to negative treatment. On the other hand, the decision is compatible with the original intent of the WC Act, that is, to assure employers that their liability is limited to covered employees and dependents.